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YOU BELONG WITH ME:
RECORDING ARTISTS’ FIGHT FOR
OWNERSHIP OF THEIR MASTERS
Ann Herman*
ABSTRACT—Copyright law, governed by the Copyright Act, is based
on utilitarian theory, which balances artists’ interests in ownership of their
creations with the public’s interest in accessing and enjoying such creations.
Copyright law provides for rights for creators of sound recordings, which
include master rights—the recording artist’s copyright in the recording.
Taylor Swift has brought the concept of master rights into the forefront of
pop culture. In June 2019, Swift’s masters—the original sound recordings of
her songs—were sold, and she publicly aired her dissatisfaction with the sale,
as well as with overall premise that artists do not have a complete right of
ownership over their masters. In this Note, I analyze the rhetoric of Taylor
Swift and other musicians and determine that many artists, based on their
rhetoric in expressing their views of ownership rights under the current
copyright regime, seem to favor a property rights model of copyright law, in
which the creator of a work is entitled to ownership of it. Based on these
observations, I suggest some solutions which propose changes to copyright
law and state law, inspired by previous solutions posed by other scholars,
that would place artists’ rights to ownership and control of their work at the
forefront of the laws’ purpose. This, in turn, will spur creativity and create a
copyright regime that is fairer to artists and listens to what they want.
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I. CALL IT WHAT YOU WANT:
THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The Constitution of the United States provides for the “promot[ion] [of]
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”1 This constitutional grant provides the basis of U.S. copyright
law. U.S. copyright law is governed by the federal government under the
Copyright Act.2 Copyright protection in the U.S. is largely premised on
utilitarian theories of intellectual property, of which copyright law is a facet.3
Utilitarian theories seek to balance the interests of authors, creators, and
inventors with the interests of the public.4 Utilitarian theory recognizes the
importance of incentivizing creation while also making such creation
available for the public’s use and benefit. U.S. copyright law seeks to reach
such a balance.
Apart from the utilitarian theory, there are various other theories of
intellectual property, such as property rights theory and personhood theory.
Property rights theory is largely based upon the theories of John Locke.5
Locke believed one should be able to ascertain ownership over the things she
creates—the fruits of her labor. While this theory originally applied to
physical property, it has been expanded to intellectual property. Thus, one
who creates a work of art is entitled to the ownership of her creation, for it is
her rightly owned property.
Personhood theory is largely based on the theories of Immanuel Kant
and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.6 Personhood theory stresses the
emotional and mental labor an artist or author puts into her work and the
connection she has to the finished product.7 Thus, because a creation is
inextricably linked to the creator, the creator deserves to maintain control

*

Ann Herman, J.D. candidate 2021. I would like to dedicate this Note to my grandfather and
journalist, Martin “Gene” Herman, who always inspired and encouraged me to write. He was one of my
earliest editors and supporters, and I would not be where I am today without him.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
3 See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 623–
24 (Peter Can & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003).
4 See William W. Fisher, III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
5 See id. at 170.
6 See id. at 171.
7 See id. at 171–72; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Intellectual Property, in A COMPANION TO
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 660 (Robert Goodin et al. eds., 2007).
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over it.8 Personhood theory, like property rights theory, recognizes and
emphasizes the creator’s personal relation to the work as a result of her labor
and perceives the creator’s rights as more important than the public interest.
In this Note, I analyze the rhetoric of popular musicians, most notably
Taylor Swift, regarding a musician’s right to own her master recordings. I
then parse the rhetoric to ascertain what theories of intellectual property such
rhetoric conjures and what rights such rhetoric implies to seek. I then
suggest—inspired by a survey of proposals from legal scholars—how U.S.
copyright law and state law can respond to these demands.
II. THE STORY OF US:
COPYRIGHT LAW AS RELATED TO MUSIC
Copyright rights in music are split between musical compositions and
sound recordings.9 A musical composition constitutes the written music and
lyrics, or the “instructions” for playing the song.10 A sound recording is a
recording of a performance of the musical composition.11 The songwriter or
songwriters initially own the copyright in the composition.12 The performer
or performers of a sound recording initially own the copyright in the sound
recording.13 Often, owners of musical compositions contract with music
publishing companies to license use of their music.14 Under the Copyright
Act, the owner of the copyright of a musical composition has the exclusive
rights of distribution, reproduction, public performance, public display, and
the right to create derivative works.15 These exclusive rights are alienable,
and any of them can be licensed to other parties.16 Copyright owners of sound
recordings enjoy fewer rights than do copyright owners of musical
compositions.17

8

See Fisher, supra note 4, at 172; Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 660.
JEANNE C. FROMER & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
378 (2019).
10 Id. This does not mean that the music necessarily has to be written down. It is enough for an artist
to record her song, and that would still constitute a composition.
11 Id.; Copyright Registration of Musical Compositions and Sound Recordings, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/register/pa-sr.html [https://perma.cc/K4FB-AY6L].
12 FROMER & SPRIGMAN, supra note 9, at 380.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 106.
16 FROMER & SPRIGMAN, supra note 9, at 380.
17 Id.
9
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The original sound recording is the master recording, and the copyright
rights of the recording artist are the master rights, or the masters.18 The master
recording is the recording “from which all later copies are made.”19
Ownership of the master rights provides for control over the use of the
recording.20 Often, in exchange for the financial backing of a record label,
musicians will assign their master rights to the label.21 The owner of the
master rights has the ability to control the licensing of the recording down to
who can use it, when one can use it, what purposes it can be used for, and
the price of its use.22 Thus, musicians who do not own their masters may not
be able to control how their music is used in movies, commercials, and other
types of media;23 whether the music can be publicly performed; and how the
music is released, such as through which services and platforms.24
III. SPEAK NOW:
TAYLOR SWIFT AND MUSICIAN RHETORIC
In 2006, Taylor Swift signed her first major record deal with Big
Machine Records.25 Like many young artists, this was a dream come true,
and signing away her master rights seemed like a reasonable price to pay for
the chance to release her own album.26 Now, fifteen years later, she has
publicly aired her dismay over her inability to own her master recordings.27
Taylor Swift is arguably one of the most powerful celebrities in the
music industry.28 She is also publicly vocal about musicians’ rights
18 Amanda Prahl, Taylor Swift Is Still Fighting the Battle Over Her Masters, and Here’s Why It’s So
Important, POPSUGAR (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.popsugar.com/entertainment/What-Does-MeanOwn-Your-Masters-Music-46337890 [https://perma.cc/2WV8-KXWU].
19 Elizabeth Vulaj, Singing a Different Tune: Taylor Swift & Other Artists’ Fight for Music
Ownership, PRACTITIONER INSIGHTS COMMENTARIES, Aug. 28, 2020, 2020 PRINDBRF 0225.
20 Prahl, supra note 18.
21 Id.
22 Damon Brown, Jay-Z Became Hip-Hop’s First Billionaire By Doing 1 Simple Thing Well, INC.
(June 4, 2019), https://www.inc.com/damon-brown/jay-z-is-now-hip-hops-first-billionaire-by-doing-1simple-thing-well.html [https://perma.cc/7J6H-8XFK].
23 Id.; Vulaj, supra note 19.
24 Vulaj, supra note 19.
25 Andrew Flanagan & Anastasia Tsioulcas, Taylor Swift’s Former Label Big Machine is Sold,
Rankling the Star, NPR (July 1, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/01/737613627/taylorswifts-former-label-big-machine-is-sold-rankling-the-star [https://perma.cc/3B69-GQZ6].
26
Why Owning Your Master Recordings Means Everything, AWAL (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.awal.com/blog/maintaining-ownership-rights-as-an-artist [https://perma.cc/Z74Z-ARX6];
Taylor Swift (taylorswift), TUMBLR (June 30, 2019), https://taylorswift.tumblr.com/post /185958366550
/for-years-i-asked-pleaded-for-a-chance-to-own-my [https://perma.cc/7XGN-EG67].
27 Swift, supra note 26.
28 At the American Music Awards on November 24, 2019, Swift was named the “Artist of the
Decade.” She has won twenty-nine American Music Awards, the most of any artist. American Music
Awards 2019: Taylor Swift Takes Artist of the Decade in Record-Breaking Haul, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
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pertaining to compensation for and ownership of their music. In June 2019,
Swift publicly expressed her dissatisfaction with the sale of her first six
albums to Ithaca Holding Group. 29 Swift’s underlying unhappiness with the
sale was due to her desire to own her music and her failed effort at purchasing
the master recordings of her first six albums.30 In her statement, Swift
laments her inability to purchase her masters. Although she has a new deal
with another record label—a deal that allows her to retain her master rights—
her statement alludes to feeling cheated by signing a contract at age fifteen
that divested her of those rights.31
Swift is not the only major artist that has publicly expressed the
importance of owning her master recordings and shed light on the music
industry’s de facto denial of such ownership rights. Prince publicly
denounced his record label amidst issues regarding ownership of his masters
in the early 1990s. Prince’s early grievances began with his unhappiness with
the restrictions his label placed on him.32 Prince “wanted to put out an album
whenever the urge struck him, and it could be a three-song album or a 70song album.”33 Prince firmly believed artists deserved the right to control and
own their works. In an interview with Rolling Stone in 1996, the singer
warned “[i]f you don’t own your masters, your masters own you.” 34 As
expressed by one of Prince’s attorneys, “[Prince] drew attention to the issue
of artists controlling their own destiny.”35
Rapper Jay-Z also understood the importance of owning his masters,
and in his negotiations with the record label Def Jam in 2004, Jay-Z assigned
his master rights to Def Jam with the condition that they would revert back

25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2019/nov/25/taylor-swift-wins-2019-ama-artist-of-theyear [https://perma.cc/JJB6-NQVQ]. Swift has won eleven Grammys and at the time was the youngest
artist to win Album of the Year at the Grammys; she won the award when she was twenty years old.
Taylor Swift, RECORDING ACADEMY, https://www.grammy.com/grammys/artists/taylor-swift
[https://perma.cc/BG7N-VAZD].
29 Anne Steele, Scooter Braun Makes $300 Million Deal for Big Machine Records, WALL ST. J. (June
30, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/scooter-braun-makes-300-million-deal-for-big-machine-records
-11561893008 [https://perma.cc/6SX5-4DMQ].
30 Id.
31 See Swift, supra note 26.
32 Melinda Newman, Inside Prince’s Career-Long Battle to Master His Artistic Destiny, BILLBOARD
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/cover-story/7348551/prince-battle-to-controlcareer-artist-rights [https://perma.cc/98MT-EM6U].
33 Id.
34 Rachel DeSantis, From the Beatles to Taylor Swift: Why It’s So Hard for Musicians to Own Their
Music, PEOPLE (July 1, 2019, 5:23 PM), https://people.com/music/beatles-to-taylor-swift-why-its-hardmusicians-own-their-music/ [https://perma.cc/5RTN-H5TK].
35 Newman, supra note 32.

243

NORTHWESTE RN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTE LLE CTUAL PROPERT Y

to him in ten years.36 Thus, while the ownership of one’s masters has
incredible economic incentives, ownership also has personal significance
because of the control it provides the owner.
IV. HOAX:
CURRYING THE WRONG INCENTIVES
U.S. copyright law claims to operate under an “incentives-for-artists
rationale,”37 under the premise that artists need incentives to create and that
copyright law provides those incentives. However, this rationale does not
align with the psychology of creativity nor does it reflect how copyright law
actually operates.
Professor Julie Cohen posits that copyright law, as it currently operates,
is not so much about incentivizing creativity, but rather is about providing
the framework though which copyrighted work can be exploited.38 For the
law to actually incentivize creativity, it must focus on the artists and what
drives them to create.
The psychology of creativity shows that intrinsic motivation is more
powerful than extrinsic motivation in spurring creative activity.39 Currently,
copyright law primarily provides extrinsic motivation—economic
incentives—for artists. However, artists create because “[t]ime spent and the
burden of the everyday work [of creating] is a source of pride and worth,
both as a matter of personal identity as well as professional merit.”40 An
artist’s work is “intimately linked to their self-concept[,]”41 and, as a result,
many artists have possessory interests in their work. Thus, fair copyright
laws that would incentivize artists to create would recognize artists’
possessory interests and would allow them to retain as much control as
possible over their work.

36 Zack O’Malley Greenburg, Jay-Z’s $50 Million Music Box, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2010, 6:18 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2010/09/22/jay-zs-50-million-music-box/
#19a14dc650de [https://perma.cc/QS8Z-UMN8].
37 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 141, 143.
38 Id.
39 Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the
Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2007–08 (2011).
40 Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and “Work-Makes-Work,”
Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091, 2122
(2011).
41 Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1766
(2012).
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A. Mine:
The Importance of Control
While economic rights are important, the ability to control one’s work
may be just as—if not more—important to some artists. Control can also act
as an incentive to creation.42 Ideally, artists want to control the use of their
work by limiting who can use it, how others can use it, and when others can
use it. On the other hand, artists may be interested in compensation for their
work and will cede control in return for compensation. Scholarship suggests
artists are more concerned with reputational harm, attribution, and
misattribution than they are with economic rights.43
As expressed by musicians’ rhetoric regarding ownership of masters,
control may be more important or more desirable than compensation due to
the personality and identity-representative aspects of their work. Further,
some artists simply believe they should have control over their works “for
having labored on them.”44 However, economic incentives and control are
not mutually exclusive. One aspect of control that is so important is that it
would allow an artist to decide how she wants to exploit her work. She would
have the power to have complete autonomy over her work, or she would have
the power to surrender some control in return for compensation. Control is
important because it provides an artist with the power of choice. Thus,
copyright law should address the importance of control and should not focus
solely on economic incentives.
B. Peace:
The Importance of Fairness
Research has shown that perceived workplace fairness can “lead to
enhanced creativity.”45 Further, “[w]hen organization members perceive
their environment to be fair, they voluntarily respond to higher levels of job
demands by engaging more frequently in . . . creative behavior[.]”46
Conversely, when working in environments that they perceive to be unfair,
people are less likely to generate creative ideas and are likely to feel less
motivated.47 This research has been extrapolated to the context of expressive
creators, such as recording musicians, and argues the same principles of
42 See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Rational Faith: The Utility of Fairness in Copyright, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1487, 1488 (2017).
43 Silbey, supra note 40, at 2120–21.
44 Fromer, supra note 41, at 1770.
45 Bair, supra note 42, at 1502.
46 Id. at 1503.
47 Id.
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fairness and creative output apply.48 Thus, in order to incentivize creation,
artists must feel they are being compensated fairly and are being treated
fairly regarding their ownership and control of their work.
In general, artists are likely to perceive a working environment or an
agreement as fair if they feel that “their individual preferences, interests, and
special needs are respected.”49 Having a voice in the decisions regarding their
work and being given proper credit for their work also increases perceptions
of fairness.50
Providing artists with greater property rights, as well as moral rights,
which will be discussed in Part VII of this Note, will likely cause artists to
feel that they have greater control over their work and are being treated fairly.
As a result, artists will be more likely to continue to create, and the utilitarian
goals of U.S. copyright law will be furthered.
V. TOLERATE IT:
WHY WE SHOULD CARE ABOUT WHAT ARTISTS WANT
Society, copyright intermediaries (such as record labels, music
publishing companies, and streaming platforms), and lawmakers should care
about what artists want. If the purpose of copyright law is to incentivize
creation, then it matters what artists perceive as being fair. Having greater
control over their works and being subject to laws that they deem as more
fair will incentivize and spur artists to create. Artists are the backbone of the
copyright regime. As there would be no need for copyright protection
without artists, it only seems logical that such a regime should primarily
recognize their rights. For it is “the producers and the writers and the artists
[who] are the ones who are making music what it is[,]” 51 not the public or
intermediaries. While copyright law is artist-centered on its face, in reality,
it is not.52 “Although the incentives-for-authors story [of copyright law]
purports to celebrate authors, it has supported a system of property rights that
48

Id. at 1504.
Id. at 1511.
50 Id. at 1511–12.
51 Glenn Rowley, Taylor Swift Talks Changing Music Industry, Taking Control, BILLBOARD (Nov.
5, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/pop/8542711/taylor-swift-talks-changing-musicindustry-taking-control [https://perma.cc/9EVV-V45G].
52
See Cohen, supra note 37, at 144. Copyright law purports to incentivize creativity and create a
system where an author is compensated for her work, so that she can devote the proper time and effort to
it. Copyright law also focuses on protecting an artist’s work so that she is willing to disseminate her work
to the public. Thus, on its face, the law seeks to protect artists. However, particularly in the music industry,
music has become commercialized, and record labels and other music production companies have used
the law to profit themselves. Often, due to access to more resources, these entities have greater bargaining
power than the artist and can use the law to provide incentives to artists in a way that increases their own
profits while taking rights away from the artist. Id. at 142–44.
49
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as a practical matter relegates authors to the economic . . . margins of the
intellectual property system.”53 Society and intermediaries are the
beneficiaries of creative output, and it follows that they should have the
burden of adapting to laws favoring artists. For, as society and intermediaries
have learned to adapt to the current copyright regime, they would be able to
adapt to a new, more artist-friendly regime. To achieve optimal
incentivization of creation, as copyright law purports to do, artists must come
first.
VI. COME BACK . . . BE HERE:
THE IMPLICATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Much of musicians’ rhetoric regarding ownership of masters is
reminiscent of property rights theory—that the creator has property rights in
the fruits of her labor. Property rights theory is more artist-friendly than
utilitarian theory because, at a base level, property rights theory provides for
the creator’s exclusive property ownership of her creation. This theory has
been interpreted as a “value-added” theory.54 If the product of one’s labor
provides value to society, then she deserves to be rewarded for her
contribution.55 A reward may come in the form of control or ownership of
her contribution. As artistic works have long been considered valuable to
society, artists should be rewarded for the value they add to it. 56
Thus, if U.S. copyright law strictly adhered to property rights theory,
musicians’ property rights would always be paramount to the public’s
interest in access to musicians’ work because the musician deserves to have
such rights due to her efforts or due to the positive public value of her
creations.
In her post about the sale of her masters in 2019, Swift emphasized the
importance of owning her work.57 She stated “[y]ou deserve to own the art
you make,”58 suggesting the importance of property rights for an artist, in
line with property rights theories. In her acceptance speech for Artist of the
Decade at the American Music Awards in November 2019, Swift described

53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 144.
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 305 (1988).
Id.
Id.
Swift, supra note 26.
Id.
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the award as celebrating “a decade of hard work and of art . . . ,”59 once again
alluding to property rights theories.
But why are these property rights so important? As explained in Part IV
of this Note, a main reason is control. Ownership of one’s masters provides
her with control over what others can do with her work. Many of the issues
Prince had with his record label were about his lack of control. Because
Prince had signed his master rights to his record label, he was unable to
release music without the label’s approval.60 Prince once likened the control
his label had over him to slavery.61 While this is an exaggeration, he clearly
wanted to convey how confining and dehumanizing he felt his situation to
be. In addition to requiring artists to assign their master rights to the record
label, many recording contracts place creative restrictions on artists and lure
them into long-term contracts that prevent them from making music. Typical
recording contracts “require the exclusive personal services of the artist with
respect to recording as a feature artist, for the duration of the contract” and
are often “structured to require a minimal commitment on the part of the
record label to actually record any albums, while reserving a considerable
number of unilateral options to require additional albums.”62 This enables
record labels to “renew and extend the term of the recording contract on the
same terms that applied at the beginning of the deal,”63 which may be unfair
and do not take into account an artist’s increasing popularity and bargaining
power.
Depending on the artists’ popularity when entering into the contract, a
recording contract may stipulate that the label will only release music that is
“commercially satisfactory,” or music that it thinks will sell well.64 Thus, the
record label may have the ability to block artists’ music that it does not like.
Further, many recording contracts’ durations are “stated in terms of delivery,
instead of specific time periods.”65 Thus, depending on how long it takes the
artist to record the number of songs specified in the contract to the label’s
liking, “a contract requiring delivery of five studio albums could easily span

59 Alyssa Bailey, Taylor Swift’s AMAs Artist of the Decade Speech Was All Love, No Drama, ELLE
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.elle.com/culture/celebrities/a29847923/taylor-swift-amas-artist-of-thedecade-speech-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/53T3-ZJKY].
60 Newman, supra note 32.
61 Id.
62
Tuneen E. Chisolm, Whose Song Is That: Searching for Equity and Inspiration for Music Vocalists
Under the Copyright Act, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 274, 308 (2017).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. For example, a recording contract may include language stipulating that the initial contract
period and each renewal period end “six to nine months after the delivery of the last album required for
that period, but no less than a specified minimum time period[.]” Id. (internal brackets omitted).
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a period of more than seven years.”66 As a result, artists “could remain
trapped in an unfavorable deal for years, despite success of early albums that
would otherwise give the artist enough clout to negotiate a better deal.”67
Rapper Lupe Fiasco expressed similar rhetoric to Prince when he
claimed he was “a hostage” to his label because if he did not give his label
what it wanted, “at the end of the day the album wasn’t coming out.”68 Singer
Kelly Clarkson expressed dissatisfaction with her label because it pressured
her to change her look and sound in ways she was unhappy with because it
believed that would sell better.69 Further, the label would not let her create
the music that she wanted to create and controlled the genre and the specific
songs that Clarkson could release.70 Singer JoJo also had an issue with her
label where it continuously delayed the release of her album. Because her
contract stipulated that she could not record music outside of the recordings
done with her label for the duration of the contract, she was unable to
continue to create music simply because her label would not release the
music she had created.71 Similarly, it took years for singer Sky Ferreira to
create an album that her label approved of, and the label continually delayed
the album’s release.72 Swift has also alluded to creative constraints while she
was with her previous record label.73
Rapper Iggy Azalea, who recently entered into a deal with a label to
create a new album in which she retains the master rights, has also expressed
disillusionment with the music industry norms. 74 Azalea posted on Twitter in
response to Swift’s statement regarding the sale of her masters. Azalea
supported Swift’s call for musicians to be able to own their master rights.
She alluded to her own issues with the industry and stated, “this is why I’m
so happy to own my master [recordings] for this new album, they really do
66

Id. at 308–09.
Id. at 309.
68 Aylin Zafar, What It’s Like When a Label Won’t Release Your Album, BUZZFEED (May 12, 2013),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/azafar/what-happens-when-your-favorite-artist-is-legally-unable-to
[https://perma.cc/B97E-88FT].
69 Brian Hiatt, Kelly Clarkson on ‘The Voice,’ New Album, Her Dramatic Clashes with Old Label,
ROLLING STONE (Mar. 20, 2018, 12:50PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/kellyclarkson-on-the-voice-new-album-her-dramatic-clashes-with-old-label-203672/ [https://perma.cc/U32R
-DDUN].
70 Id.
71 Zafar, supra note 68.
72 Id.
73 Rowley, supra note 51 (“In my previous situation, there were creative constraints, issues that we
had over the years[.]”).
74 Iggy Azalea (@IGGYAZALEA), TWITTER (June 30, 2019, 4:30 PM), https://twitter.com/IGGY
AZALEA/status/1145444575521181696.
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[people] crazy dirty on ownership of their intellectual property in the
[business].” 75
Singer Ciara also entered a deal with a new label in which she retains
the master rights and has expressed that “[b]eing able to own [her] masters
has been really cool. . . . To have that freedom and flexibility is amazing.”76
Ciara’s statements again express the importance of control for artists and the
constraints that lack of control places on them.
If copyright law adhered to a property rights model, artists would have
greater control over their work and would not feel that their creative
expression or freedom was stifled by the business strategies of record labels.
As the law stands, the artists, who are encouraged and incentivized to create,
are prevented from fully expressing themselves and creating due to the
restrictions and demands of the labels that are meant to release the artists’
creations to the public. The current model neither incentivizes creation nor
benefits the public interest if artists are unable to create what and as much as
they want.
VII.
I’M ONLY ME WHEN I’M WITH YOU:
THE IMPLICATION OF MORAL RIGHTS
An artist’s ownership of her masters also reflects the personal ties she
has to her work. Because art is expressive, many artists feel their work is
more than just a completed piece, but that it is part of themselves and reflects
who they are.77 Because artists have such intense ties to their work,
ownership of the work is about more than monetary gains. It is about artistic
autonomy and owning a piece of themselves.78
Throughout her career, Swift has been open about the emotional
connection she has to her work. In an op-ed she wrote for the Wall Street
Journal in 2014, Swift alluded to the effort and emotional taxation of
creating her music as an aspect of the music’s value.79 She stressed that
“[m]usic is art, and art is important and rare.”80 In speaking about her desire
to own her masters, Swift related the importance of ownership to her
personal life and childhood dreams. When she realized she was unable to
purchase her master recordings and that they would be sold, she “had to make
75

Id.
Vulaj, supra note 19.
77
See generally Fromer, supra note 41.
78 Id.
79 Taylor Swift, For Taylor Swift, the Future of Music is a Love Story, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2014,
6:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-taylor-swift-the-future-of-music-is-a-love-story-140476321
9?ns=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/XD5C-MLUD] (“In my opinion, the value of an album is, and
will continue to be, based on the amount of heart and soul an artist had bled into a body of work[.]”).
80 Id.
76
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the excruciating choice to leave behind [her] past.”81 For Swift, her music is
part of her, so giving up ownership felt like parting with a piece of herself.
Musicians and other celebrities have publicly supported Swift’s cries
for ownership, and their rhetoric furthers the notion that both musicians and
non-musicians recognize an emotional connection between a musician and
her work.82 In support of Swift’s plea for ownership, singer Halsey spoke of
the emotional impact of Swift’s work and referred to Swift’s work as “the
painstaking labor of [Swift’s] heart.”83 Recording artists have an undeniable
connection to their work that should be recognized when considering
ownership rights of these works.
VIII.

BEGIN AGAIN:
SOLUTIONS

Solutions that provide artists with greater control over their works can
be accomplished by alterations to the Copyright Act and state laws that
address both property rights and moral rights.
A. Our Song:
Addressing Property Rights
Section 203 of the Copyright Act provides an author the right to
terminate a grant of her rights thirty-five years after the execution of the
grant.84 In order to exercise her termination rights, an author must provide
advance notice to the current owner of the rights at least two years before the
date on which she can begin to exercise her termination rights.85 An author’s
termination rights are inalienable but must be exercised within five years of

81

Swift, supra note 26.
See generally Kathryn Lindsay, Everyone Who Is Wrapped up in the Taylor Swift-Scooter Braun
Drama, REFINERY29 (July 1, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2019/07
/236691/taylor-scooter-big-machine-artists-celebrities-reactions [https://perma.cc/YFH3-HFXC]; Dan
Clarendon, Celebrities Stand with Taylor Swift Amid Scooter Braun and Scott Borchetta AMAs 2019
Drama, US WKLY. (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/pictures/celebritiesstand-with-taylor-swift-amid-amas-2019-drama-pics [https://perma.cc/E7DE-3GU3]. Singer Selena
Gomez’s mother, Mandy Teefey, referred to Swift’s music as Swift’s “blood, sweat and tears, especially
as a young woman who shared growing up in front of the world[.]” Mandy Teefey (@mandyteefey),
INSTAGRAM (June 30, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/BzWVSJjhT7Y/. Model Martha Hunt also
referred to Swift’s music as her “blood, sweat, + tears.” Martha Hunt (@MarthHunt), TWITTER (June 30,
2019, 7:29 PM), https://twitter.com/MarthaHunt/status/1145489481652482048.
83 Halsey (@halsey), TWITTER (June 30, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://twitter.com/halsey/status
/1145435250295635968. Singer Halsey expressed: “[Swift’s music] made my teeth ache like cold water
and my heart swell and my eyes leak[.]” Id.; see also Lindsay, supra note 82.
84 17 U.S.C. § 203.
85 Id. § 203(a)(4).
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the end of the thirty-five-year period, or she loses her rights to terminate a
grant of ownership.86
It’s Nice to Have a Friend:
Inalienable Ownership Rights
A change to U.S. copyright law that would favor artists’ property rights
would be to make copyright ownership rights inalienable. Under such a
scheme, an author could license uses of her work; for example, she could
license rights to a record label to produce and market her recordings, but she
could not transfer her full ownership rights of those recordings. While this
would be a radical departure from current practice in the music industry, the
industry could adapt to such a change. Instead of it being customary for
artists to transfer ownership rights to record labels, it would become
customary for artists to retain the ownership rights and only license rights
for particular uses, such as for production and marketing.
Further, labels would continue to be able to commercially exploit an
artist’s work even if she had an inalienable right of ownership. For, as
reflected by some artists’ ability to retain ownership rights while continuing
to work with labels, labels still stand to profit from exploiting artists’ works.87
As in Taylor Swift’s current situation, she likely would approve of
inalienable ownership rights for artists, as expressed by her beliefs that artists
“deserve to own the art [they] make.”88 However, amidst this belief, she has
not ceased providing her music to the public or working with record labels.
In November 2018, Universal Music Group announced its contract with
Swift making it her “exclusive worldwide recorded music partner” and that
the Universal Music Group-owned label, Republic Records, will serve as her
record label.89 The agreement allows Swift to retain ownership rights in her
masters.90 So, allowing artists to retain ownership rights can still be
worthwhile for record labels.
1.

2.

Long Live:
Decreasing the Termination Period and Making it Perpetual
According to the legislative history of the Copyright Act, Congress
included a termination provision in recognition of the unequal bargaining
86

Id. § 203(a)(3), (5).
Taylor Swift, Jay-Z, Rhianna, Iggy Azalea, Frank Ocean, Ciara, and other artists have struck
agreements with record labels to continue to work with them and share profits while still retaining their
ownership rights. See Vulaj, supra note 19.
88 Swift, supra note 26.
89 Jem Aswad & Chris Willman, Taylor Swift Signs Landmark New Deal with Universal Music
Group, VARIETY (Nov. 19, 2018, 7:06 AM), https://variety.com/2018/music/news/taylor-swift-newsalert-1203032124/ [https://perma.cc/AKB9-CSTC].
90 Id.
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power of new artists in contrast to the entities with which they contract.91
While the addition of a termination provision is favorable to artists, the
provision does not do enough to protect an artist’s ownership rights and still
pays too much heed to the interests of industry titans. In order to level the
playing field, the termination period should be reduced, and the termination
right should be perpetual.
The logic behind providing an extended period before which an artist
may exercise her termination rights is to enable record labels and other
distribution agencies a chance to regain the economic capital they invested
in promoting an artist.92 Because it is difficult to determine the success of an
artist when a label signs them, the label takes a financial risk in doing so.
Thus, if the artist becomes successful and a lucrative asset to the label, the
thirty-five-year period from the grant of rights to when the artist can exercise
her termination rights gives the record label plenty of time to profit or break
even on its investment.
Thirty-five years is more than enough time for a record label to make
back any losses from the investment and to realize profits on the risky
investment that is signing an artist.93 Providing record labels with thirty-five
years to economically exploit the artist’s work is a significant portion of the
artist’s copyright term.94 Professor Jessica Litman has proposed decreasing
the termination period from thirty-five years to fifteen years from the transfer
of the original grant of ownership.95 Fifteen years, while considerably less
time than thirty-five years, is still a sufficient amount of time “to make
investment in copyrighted works worthwhile.”96 Professor Litman’s fifteenyear proposal is appropriate, but not with the five-year notice period. If the
termination period is to be fifteen years, the notice period should be reduced
or eliminated altogether, as explained in more detail in Section VIII(A)(3) of
this Note. With the current notice provisions, artists should be able to

91 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740 (“[Section
203] is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the
impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical
compromise . . . .”).
92 Amy Gilbert, Note, The Time Has Come: A Proposed Revision to 17 U.S.C. § 203, 66 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 807, 816–17 (2016).
93
See generally Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 48 (2010).
94 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–03. A typical copyright term for an author, when the work is not a work made
for hire, is the life of the author plus seventy years. The term is the same for joint works, but the measuring
life is the life of the longest-living author.
95 Litman, supra note 93, at 48. Professor Litman also proposes increasing the minimum amount of
notice to five years in combination with the decreased termination period. Id.
96 Id.
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exercise their termination rights ten—to a maximum of fifteen—years from
the original grant of ownership.
Record labels are sophisticated parties aware of the termination rights
provided in the Copyright Act. Ten years provides labels plenty of time to
determine the profitability of an artist and to make back money invested in
them. Limiting the termination period provides artists with a greater sense of
control over their work by providing them with the chance to reclaim their
ownership rights in a foreseeable amount of time.
Additionally, the termination right should be perpetual. An artist should
be able to determine when they want to exercise their termination rights, and
if that is over forty years, that should be their prerogative. Doing away with
the five-year limitation to exercise termination rights does nothing to harm a
record label’s planning for the termination and gives the artist the deserved
autonomy over her ownership rights and actions.
3.

I Knew You Were Trouble:
Eliminating the Notice Provision of 17 U.S.C. § 203
The notice provision is meant to provide the current holder of the to-beterminated copyright rights time to plan for the loss of those rights when the
author terminates them.97 While it makes sense that the current holder should
receive notice of termination, anyone involved in the music industry,
particularly record labels, would be familiar with the termination right and
would understand the possibility that an artist may seek to exercise that right
thirty-five years from the grant. Such an extensive notice period actually
gives the current holder time to devalue the copyright.98 For example, prior
to the termination date, as communicated in the notice, the current holder
could make the copyrighted work widely available at reduced prices in the
hopes of increasing demand for the work, so that once the rights revert to the
original owner, the value of the copyrighted work is significantly
diminished.99 This way, the current rights holder can attempt to make as
much money from the work as they can while they still own it, so that once
the work reverts back to the original owner, there is not much value in it, and
thus the current holder is not losing much in losing ownership. While there
is no guarantee that a current holder would take such unscrupulous action,
the risk to the original owner remains. Because the amount of notice required
appears to be arbitrary, and current holders are likely aware of the

97 Gilbert, supra note 92, at 845–46. The legislative history fails to provide reasoning for the
implementation of the notice provision. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 126).
98 Gilbert, supra note 92, at 846.
99 Id. at 837.
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termination provision and had thirty-five years to plan for such termination,
the amount of notice should be eliminated or at least drastically reduced.100
No notice is a plausible solution because of the current owner’s
knowledge of when an artist may exercise her termination rights. The current
owner can take affirmative steps and discuss with the artist whether she plans
to exercise her termination rights. Alternatively, a reduction in the notice
period would still provide warning to the current owner—which is likely the
reasoning behind the provision—and prompt them to plan for the ultimate
termination. Additionally, a reduced or eliminated notice period would
protect artists from unscrupulous actors by preventing them from having
time to devalue the artist’s work. Eliminating the notice period would also
protect artists who may not have competent legal support who would inform
them of the notice requirement or who are unaware of the intricacies of the
Copyright Act. These artists would lose their ability to re-gain their
ownership rights simply because they did not have the proper information.
4.

I Forgot That You Existed:
The Role of State Law in Protecting Master Rights
In addition to changes in the Copyright Act, artists’ ownership of their
master rights can be achieved through state law. Artists are often divested of
their master rights through contracts with record labels. In addition to, or in
lieu of, changing the Copyright Act, states can pass their own laws regarding
what can and cannot be written into contracts and how recording artists are
categorized with regards to works made for hire as applied to copyright
ownership of master recordings.101 However, without any changes to the
Copyright Act, these laws cannot conflict with the Act because, as a federal
law, it would preempt any conflicting state law.102 Such laws should focus on
artists’ ownership rights and should strive to preserve artists’ ownership over
master recordings. Such laws should also seek fairness in recording contracts
so that artists with little bargaining power are not induced to agree to unfair
deals that hold them hostage to their label.

100

Id. at 845–46.
States may impose statutory restrictions on contracts “so long as their laws do not run afoul of
some specific federal constitutional prohibition.” David E. Bernstein, Freedom of Contract (GMU Law
& Econ. Research Paper Series No. 08-51, 2008), https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications
/working_papers/08-51%20Freedom%20of%20Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMB6-TRM7] (quoting
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963)).
102 Preemption, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption [https://perma.cc
/8S2J-KEQK].
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a.

Epiphany:
Clarify When a Sound Recording is a Work Made for Hire
One solution is tackling the work made for hire problem. Under the
Copyright Act, a work can be categorized as a “work made for hire.”103 This
means that the author of the work created it in the course of her employment
or was hired for the purpose of making the work and thus is not the legal
“author” of the work—her employer is. The Act defines a work made for
hire as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or a work specially ordered or commissioned . . . ” for use in
specific copyrightable works listed in the statute.104 Currently, sound
recordings are not listed as a type of work that may be “specially ordered or
commissioned” as a work made for hire, and it is unclear whether or not they
may be considered works made for hire.105 If they may be, this would prevent
the original copyright owner from exercising her § 203 termination rights, as
those rights do not apply to works made for hire.106 To address this problem,
state law could prohibit record labels from declaring that master recordings
are works made for hire when the recording artist is not an employee of the
label. Alternatively, as done in California, state law could delineate specific
factors that must be shown in order for a recording artist to qualify as an
employee, so that it is clear-cut when a recording artist enters into an
agreement whether they will be considered an employee or an independent
contractor.
In 1999, Congress passed an amendment to the Copyright Act that
included sound recordings in the list of works that could be specially ordered
or commissioned as a work made for hire.107 However, the amendment was
vehemently opposed by recording artists who successfully lobbied Congress
to repeal it; thus, sound recordings are not included in the types of works that
may be specially ordered or commissioned as works made for hire.108 If the
amendment had remained in force, it would be significantly easier for sound
recordings to be considered works made for hire, and thus it would be
significantly easier for recording artists to lose their termination rights.
Even with sound recordings being excluded from potential specially
ordered or commissioned works, the work made for hire provision still
threatens to divest artists of their termination rights. Often, recording

103

17 U.S.C. § 101.
Id.
105 Abdullahi Abdullahi, Note, Termination Rights in Music: A Practical Framework for Resolving
Ownership Conflicts in Sound Recordings, 2012 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 457, 464–65 (2012).
106 17 U.S.C. § 203.
107 Abdullahi, supra note 105, at 464–65.
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contracts state that while recording artists are not employees of the record
label, their masters are works made for hire.109 Further, contracts frequently
state that in the event that the masters are determined not to be works made
for hire, the artist assigns the masters to the record label and grants the label
a power of attorney to transfer the master rights to the label in the event the
artist refuses to sign the transfer.110 Thus, even though a sound recording is
not one of the enumerated works in the Copyright Act that can be specially
ordered or commissioned as a work made for hire, record labels still attempt
to contractually make sound recordings works made for hire in order to grant
the label greater control over the work. While courts may deem such a
contractual clause unenforceable, and while the few cases regarding
termination rights have been resolved in favor of the artist,111 this does
nothing to prevent record labels from fighting an artist attempting to exercise
her termination rights. And, as the more powerful party in many situations,
the record label likely has greater resources to fight a lengthy suit and may
willing to do so in order to prevent an artist from exercising her termination
rights and losing its control over a lucrative asset—the artist’s works.
If sound recordings were deemed to be works made for hire, recording
artists’ property rights in their work and the control they can exert over their
work would be significantly limited. Particularly relating to recording artists
who already do not possess control over their works in the form of ownership
of the underlying musical composition, the inability to utilize the termination
provision would provide them with almost no rights in their work, which is
starkly against the creation incentives of utilitarian theory. To remedy this
problem, state laws could prohibit record labels from stipulating in recording
contracts that the recording artist is not an employee of the record label, but
the works are works made for hire nonetheless. The law would require that
either the artist must be considered an employee of the record label under the
contract (and be paid a salary and benefits accordingly), and thus works
would be deemed works made for hire; or the contract must provide that the
artist is not an employee of the record label, and thus any master recording
she makes would not be owned by the record label and would not be a work
made for hire.
Alternatively, state law can strengthen protections for recording artists
as independent contractors. California has recently addressed the work made

109 Elizabeth Henslee & William Henslee, You Don’t Own Me: Why Work for Hire Should Not Be
Applied to Sound Recordings, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 695, 711 (2011).
110 Id.
111 Abdullahi, supra note 105, at 476.
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for hire problem in an amendment to its labor code.112 Under the amendment,
recording artists are subject to stricter standards when a court determines
whether the artist is an employee or an independent contractor.113 This
classification has important implications for the artist’s work. If the artist is
determined an employee, the artist’s work is a work made for hire and her
ownership rights are divested. If the artist is an independent contractor, her
work is her own creation and her ownership rights are preserved. This new
law—subjecting recording artists to a stricter legal test—makes it more
difficult to prove that a recording artist is an employee, as opposed to an
independent contractor. Thus, it is less likely that a recording artist’s work
will be considered a work made for hire when that was not the intention of
the parties. Therefore, state laws could also use this model of protecting
recording artists from crooked works-made-for-hire claims by record labels.
Changes to state law would not dramatically alter the copyright
landscape and are in line with European countries.114 These changes would
simply prevent record labels from claiming exclusive ownership of sound
recording rights under a work-made-for-hire claim and would allow
recording artists to retain their termination rights. However, such laws would
still provide for works made for hire in appropriate situations. Additionally,
these changes would decrease frivolous lawsuits by record labels attempting
to deprive artists of their termination rights by claiming recordings as works
made for hire or would make it much clearer when a recording artist’s work
is a work made for hire and when it is not. Further, state laws of this nature
112
Legis. Assemb. B. No. 2257 (Cal. 2020), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient
.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB2257 [https://perma.cc/BUS8-WTYD]; CAL. LAB. CODE § 2780 (West
2020).
113 Id. The Amendment provides for the use of the multi-factor Borello test in determining whether
a recording artist is an employee or independent contractor, instead of the less-comprehensive ABC test.
See Anthony J. Oncidi et al., California Amends Independent Contractor Law (Again)—New Exemptions
for Music Industry Workers, Freelance Writers and Photographers, PROSKAUER (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://calemploymentlawupdate.proskauer.com/2020/09/california-amends-independent-contractor-law
-again-new-exemptions-for-music-industry-workers-freelance-writers-and-photographers/
[https://perma.cc/5ARN-ES9K]. The Borello test “requires consideration of all potentially relevant
facts—no single factor controls the determination.” Independent Contractor Versus Employee, STATE OF
CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELS., https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontractor.htm
[https://perma.cc/D3W3-56VN].
114 See Fromer, supra note 41. Discussing French law, Fromer states

In fact, French copyright law . . . holds as “a dominant principle . . . that only a natural person
may be an author.” Therefore, French law, albeit with some exceptions, “precludes the
existence . . . of doctrines of works for hire that vest not only the initial ownership of copyright,
but also the status of author, in the employer.”
Id. at 1796 (quote omissions in original); see also Paul E. Geller, International Copyright: The
Introduction, 1 INT’L COPYRIGHT L. & PRAC. § 6[2][b][ii] (2018) (“German law vests all rights in a work
made on the job in the flesh-and-blood author of the work, but allows an employer to use this work,
effectively as a licensee, consistently with the underlying ‘service or employment relationship.’”).
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would not be preempted by the Copyright Act, as sound recordings are not
specifically listed as works that can be specially ordered or commissioned as
works made for hire.
b.

We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together:
Limiting the Duration of Recording Contracts
Additionally, state laws should limit the duration of recording contracts.
As explained previously, typical recording contracts are “stated in terms of
delivery, instead of specific time periods.”115 In order to prevent the situation
in which an artist is stuck in a contract with a record label, state laws should
limit how long recording contracts can last. This would provide the artist
with an exit opportunity from an undesirable or limiting contract and enable
her to seek to negotiate a new contract with the same or a different label.
Under California law, personal service contracts may not last for a
duration of more than seven years.116 However, the law provides an exception
for contracts rendering “personal service in the production of phonorecords
in which sounds are first fixed”117—or for contracts regarding master
recordings. Thus, for recording contracts, in order to get out of a contract of
a duration of more than seven years, the artist must give written notice to the
record label “specifying that the [artist] from and after a future date certain
specified in the notice will no longer render service under the contract.”118
Further, the record label would then have the “right to recover damages for
a breach of the contract during its term”119 and “for each phonorecord as to
which that party has failed to render service.”120 Thus, California law does
not easily allow a recording artist to get out of a recording contract in a time
period less than seven years. California law should allow recording artists to
have the rights of other personal service contractors without the limitations
of a notice requirement. The law should also prevent a label from being able
to sue the artist for damages as to every unproduced phonorecord, and other
states should follow suit.
State law should place a time-limit—not based upon output—on
recording contracts, after which the recording artist is free to get out of the
contract. Recording contracts would then have to be tailored to end within
that time limit and the artist must be able to end the contract after that limit
without being sued for damages for breach of contract or for every
115
116
117
118
119
120

Chisolm, supra note 62, at 308.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 2007).
Id. § 2855(b).
Id. § 2855(b)(1).
Id. § 2855(b)(2).
Id. § 2855(b)(3).
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unproduced phonorecord. Such a law would prevent artists from being held
in unfavorable contracts for an unknown and elongated duration. This would
allow recording artists to seek labels that offer them better deals and would
allow artists to leverage any increased bargaining power they may have
amassed since initially signing a contract. Such a law would be fair to the
artist and would spur creative activity by encouraging artists to seek
agreements that allow them to create what they want and give them a sense
of control over their creations.
B. Wildest Dreams:
Addressing Moral Rights
Moral rights provide artists with noneconomic protection of their
work.121 Traditional moral rights include the rights of attribution and
integrity.122
In 1990, Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).123 The
Act provides for moral rights for artists of “work[s] of visual art.”124 While
moral rights are provided to artists in many European countries, they are
generally not provided to artists in the U.S.125 VARA adds a limited set of
moral rights to U.S. copyright law by providing creators of works of visual
art with the rights of attribution and integrity. Specifically, artists have the
right: (1) “to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create;” and (2) “to prevent the use of his
or her name as the author of the work . . . in the event of a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to
his or her honor or reputation[.]” 126 VARA provides artists with control over
certain uses of their work they find offensive or degrading to their reputation.
VARA’s legislative history reveals that it was passed to recognize and
emphasize the importance of art and artists. The legislative history notes,
“[t]he arts are an integral element of our civilization; the arts are fundamental
to our national character and are among the greatest of our national
treasures.”127
While VARA is an important step in incorporating moral rights into
U.S. copyright law, VARA’s limited nature is firmly rooted in utilitarian

121 See Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795,
801–02 (2001).
122 Id.
123 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
124 Id.
125 ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY 37 (2009).
126 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
127 H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 7 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917.
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principles prevalent in the law. As expressed in the legislative history,
“[b]ecause of its limited nature, [VARA] protects the legitimate interests of
visual artists without inhibiting the rights of copyright owners and users, and
without undue interference with the successful operation of the American
copyright system.”128 In order to avoid excessive expansion of moral rights,
VARA only provides protection for works of visual art, which is a narrow
definition that does not include sound recordings.129 However, VARA should
be expanded to specifically provide recording artists with moral rights
related to their masters. The language in VARA’s legislative history
acknowledges the importance of artists and the connection between an
artist’s work and her reputation.130 However, there is no reason that an artists’
connection with her art should not extend beyond visual artists.
The legislative history provides scraps of rationale for the exclusion of
other types of artistic works, specifically audiovisual works. The legislative
history harps on the differences between visual works and audiovisual
works. Audiovisual works—unlike visual works—are usually works made
for hire, and the creator of the work does not typically have economic rights
in it.131 Further, normally many copies of audiovisual works are produced
and distributed for commercial purposes.132 Because there are many copies
of a single audiovisual work available, the destruction of one copy is not
detrimental to the creator because the copy is replaceable.133 However, this
logic focuses solely on the physical destruction of a work of art as opposed
to the reputational alteration or mutilation of a work in the form of a
derivative work or other undesirable uses.
While a sound recording can be copied and distributed widely for
commercial gain like an audiovisual work, sound recordings are often not
considered works made for hire, and the creator retains economic rights in
the recording, unless they assign them. The artist does not necessarily create
the work with the knowledge that she will never own it.
Additionally, recording artists, like visual artists, are inextricably linked
to their work to the extent that “[a]ny distortion of such works is
automatically a distortion of the artists’ reputation. . . .”134 Some scholars
argue that recording artists are more connected to their work than are visual
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 10.
17 U.S.C. § 106A.
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 6.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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artists because “a voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The human
voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested” and “the singer
manifests herself in the song.”135 From the perspective that VARA is meant
to recognize the importance of art to an artists’ reputation, sound recordings
are akin to works of visual art.
Because works of visual art are different from sound recordings, the
rights of VARA do not have to be expanded to sound recordings in a parallel
fashion. VARA, as related to sound recordings, should provide the original
recording artist the right to prevent the use of her recording for purposes she
deems to be “prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.” 136 Like typical
VARA rights, this right shall not be transferrable and shall last for the
author’s lifetime,137 but the right should not be waivable. Thus, even if the
original copyright owner in a sound recording no longer owns the copyright
in her work, she still retains control over her work in that she can object to
uses of her work she finds harmful or offensive to her reputation, such as use
of her song in an ad supporting the National Rifle Association when she is
an anti-gun advocate. Also, a record label or other entity should not be able
to attempt to take VARA rights away by providing waiver of such rights as
a contractual provision. Such a simple expansion of VARA would provide
recording artists with the important right of integrity. This would protect an
artist’s reputation with regard to her works and would provide her with an
important sense of control of property she deems as indistinguishable from
her person and reputation.
The right of integrity is provided for recording artists in the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms
Treaty (WPPT). The U.S. is a signatory to the WPPT, but “[d]espite the
commitments the United States made in joining WPPT, the treaty has had no
effect on performers’ [(including recording artists’)] rights under domestic
law.”138 Under U.S. law, such moral rights must be specifically contracted
for in order for an artist to exercise them.139 Providing recording artists with
such moral rights would simply bring the U.S. into compliance with its
obligations under the WPPT. Further, some European countries, such as
France and Germany, provide performers with moral rights.140 Thus,
135 Tuneen E. Chisolm, In Lieu of Moral Rights for IP-Wronged Music Vocalists: Personhood
Theory, Moral Rights, and the WPPT Revisited, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 453, 453–54 (2018) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988)).
136 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
137 Id. § 106A(d)(3), (e)(1).
138 Mary LaFrance, Are We Serious About Performers’ Rights?, 5 IP THEORY 81, 89 (2015).
139 Id.
140 See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L212-2
(Fr.); URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [URHG] [ACT ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS] § 75, Sept. 9. 1965,
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providing these rights would also bring the U.S. into harmony with other
countries.
IX. LONG STORY SHORT:
CONCLUSION
Taylor Swift’s public desire to own her masters is both reasonable and
understandable. She and all artists work hard to create their work and deserve
to have ultimate control over it. Thus, increasing both property rights and
moral rights for artists under U.S. copyright law and implementing state laws
that protect artists’ property rights will reward the very people who create
the valuable capital copyright law painstakingly attempts to protect and will
incentivize them to create. Implementing changes to U.S. copyright law and
state laws that provide greater control and are fairer to artists further the goals
of copyright law.

BGBl. I S. 1273 (Ger.), translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg
.html [https://perma.cc/B44C-JZ2N].
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